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Abstract 
 
Temporal binding refers to a phenomenon whereby the time interval between a cause and its 
effect is perceived as shorter than the same interval separating two unrelated events. We 
examined the developmental profile of this phenomenon by comparing the performance of 
groups of children (aged 6-7-, 7-8-, and 9-10- years) and adults on a novel interval estimation 
task. In Experiment 1, participants made judgments about the time interval between i) their 
button press and a rocket launch, and ii) a non-causal predictive signal and rocket launch. In 
Experiment 2, an additional causal condition was included in which participants made 
 
judgments about the interval between an experimenter’s button press and the launch of 
a rocket. Temporal binding was demonstrated consistently and did not change in magnitude 
with age: estimates of delay were shorter in causal contexts for both adults and children. 
Additionally, the magnitude of the binding effect was greater when participants themselves 
were the cause of an outcome compared to when they were mere spectators. This suggests 
that although causality underlies the binding effect, intentional action may modulate its 
magnitude. Again, this was true of both adults and children. Taken together, these results 
are the first to suggest that the binding effect is present and developmentally constant from 
childhood into adulthood. 
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The Developmental Profile of Temporal Binding: From Childhood to Adulthood 
 
The relation between time and causality in adults is bidirectional: not only is temporal 
information used when making causal inferences (e.g., Bramley, Gerstenberg, Mayrhofer, 
2018; Shanks, Pearson & Dickinson, 1989), but causal representations influence the 
perception of both the temporal order of and temporal interval between events (Bechlivanidis 
 
& Lagnado, 2013, 2016; Buehner, 2012, 2015; Haggard, Clarke & Kalogeras, 2002; Tecwyn 
et al., under review). The perception of a cause and its direct effect as temporally closer than 
two causally unrelated events is known as temporal binding, and it is this phenomenon, and 
specifically its developmental profile, that is the focus of the current study. 
 
Although initial research suggested that temporal binding was primarily observed in 
contexts in which the cause is an intentional action (e.g., a button press that causes a tone, 
Haggard et al., 2002), subsequent studies indicate that this phenomenon generalizes to other 
sorts of causal-effect relations (Buehner, 2012; Suzuki, Lush, Seth, & Roseboom, 2019). 
Considerable research in the last two decades has examined the nature of temporal binding 
(e.g., Buehner & Humphreys, 2009; Engbert, Wohlschlager & Haggard, 2008), what factors 
modulate its magnitude (e.g., Moreton, Callan, & Hughes, 2017; Poonian & Cunnington, 
2013), and how it presents in clinical populations (Haggard, Martin, Taylor-Clarke, 
Jeannerod & Franck, 2003; Voss et al., 2010). However, as yet, its developmental profile is 
unclear. To date, only three studies have explored temporal binding in children, and 
moreover their findings are inconsistent. Thus, it is not known to what extent causal 
representations have similar top-down effects on time perception in children as in adults. 
 
Previous Developmental Studies 
 
Cavazzana, Begliomini and Bisiacchi, (2014) were the first researchers to study 
temporal binding in children. Eight- to 10-year-olds and adults watched a screen as a series of 
letters flashed up in quick succession. Participants had to report which letter was on the 
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screen when a target event occurred. The target events to be judged (i.e., for which 
concurrent letters were to be reported) included a voluntary button press that caused a tone, 
the occurrence of a tone that was followed by another tone, or the tone that followed either of 
these first events. This novel paradigm produced results typical of temporal binding in adults: 
the voluntary action and tone were judged as occurring closer together in time than two 
causally unrelated tones. However, this pattern was not observed in children. Cavazzana, 
Begliomini and Bisiacchi (2017) subsequently reported similar findings using the same 
paradigm, and argued that difficulties in attentional control may account for the lack of 
temporal binding in children. They suggested that children were not able to direct their 
attention to the critical target events as they were instead distracted by peripheral events. 
However, this leaves open the possibility that temporal binding might be observed in children 
in a paradigm that does not place excessive demands on attentional resources, which are 
known to be underdeveloped in children (see Anderson, 2002 for review). 
 
Indeed, more recently, Blakey et al. (2018) have reported evidence of binding in 
children considerably younger than those studied by Cavazzana et al. (2014, 2017). Blakey et 
al. (2018) used a simpler task in which participants anticipated when an event would occur, 
 
rather than retrospectively reporting the perceived time of an event’s occurrence. In the 
study, 4- to 11-year-olds completed a stimulus anticipation task in which they pressed a 
button to indicate when they believed a target event (the launching of a rocket on a computer 
screen) was going to occur. Their first experiment compared a self-causal condition in which 
children pressed a button that caused the rocket to launch following a delay with a non-causal 
condition in which the rocket launched following a delay after a predictive signal. Their 
second experiment also included a machine-causal condition in which a mechanical lever 
pressed a button that caused the rocket to launch following a delay. Participants of all ages 
responded in a more anticipatory manner in the causal conditions. That is, they expected the 
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outcome of causal button presses to occur earlier than outcomes that followed a non-causal 
 
predictive signal. These results provided the first evidence that children’s causal 
 
representations influence their perception of time, with the authors arguing that temporal 
binding reflects a fundamental and early-developing way in which causal cognition and 
temporal perception interact. 
 
Blakey et al.’s (2019) findings indicate that children’s as well as adults’ temporal 
perception is affected by causal representations; what remains unclear is whether the extent of 
this influence is developmentally stable from childhood into adulthood. Making child-adult 
comparisons is difficult using existing paradigms. As discussed previously, Cavazzana et 
al.’s (2014, 2017) task may be too cognitive demanding for children. On the other hand, the 
paradigm used by Blakey et al. (2018), though more child-friendly than that of Cavazzana et 
al., also has its shortcomings. Specifically, Droit-Volet (2010) strongly advises against using 
motor-dependent tasks, such as the stimulus anticipation task of Blakey et al. (2018), when 
comparing the temporal perceptual abilities of adults and children because children typically 
take longer to initiate and complete movements than adults. 
 
The current study 
 
The goal of the current study was to establish a developmental profile for the temporal 
binding effect across childhood and into adulthood, resolving existing inconsistencies in the 
literature. Because assessing temporal binding involves comparison of a causal and non-causal 
condition, the task needed to be set in context that allowed for causal and non-causal 
event pairings; we adopted Blakey et al.’s (2019) rocket launching scenario for this purpose. 
However, in order to address the methodological issues that have been described, we measured 
time judgments differently. This involved developing a novel paradigm suitable for assessing 
time perception in both adults and children. Specifically, we sought to devise a paradigm 
sufficiently sensitive to detect the well-established developmental effects that have 
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been shown to exist within the time perception literature (e.g., Block, Zakay, & Hancock, 
1999; Droit-Volet, Clement, & Wearden, 2001; McCormack, Brown, Maylor, Darby & 
Green, 1999) without placing excessive demand on attention or motor control abilities. 
 
To this end, we devised a categorical interval estimation task that had some structural 
resemblances to tasks previously used to examine time perception in children (Droit-Volet & 
Wearden, 2001; Droit-Volet & Izaute, 2009) but also to tasks used to measure temporal 
binding in adults (Ebert & Wegner, 2010; Kumar & Srinivasan, 2017; Wen, Yamashita & 
Asama, 2015). Participants were initially trained to identify four intervals of different lengths 
(the categories). At test, participants then reported the time interval between two events by 
judging which category the interval matched. Participants completed both a causal condition 
and a non-causal condition; see Figure 2. In the causal condition, participants pressed a 
button that caused a rocket to launch following a delay. In the non-causal condition, 
participants simply observed a predictive signal that indicated the rocket would launch after a 
delay. Participants gave an estimate of the time interval between the button press (causal 
condition) or predictive signal (non-causal condition), and the rocket launch, by choosing the 
category that matched the interval. The index of temporal binding was whether participants 
judged intervals to be shorter in the causal condition compared to the non-causal condition. 
 
Even young children can produce meaningful data in simple categorical timing tasks 
that involve two time intervals: in the temporal bisection task participants are exposed to 
 
“short” and the “long” reference durations, and then judge whether other intervals are more 
similar to the short and long references (e.g., Droit-Volet, Meck, & Penney, 2007; Droit-Volet & 
Wearden, 2001; Zelanti & Droit-Volet, 2011). However, we were concerned that the bisection 
task, with its use of just two categories, would not be sufficiently sensitive to pick up binding 
effects, which are typically small and in the order of tens of milliseconds. Indeed, previous 
research suggests that the bisection task does not reliably pick up age differences 
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between middle childhood and adulthood (e.g., Droit-Volet, Tourret, & Wearden, 2004; 
McCormack et al., 1999), which may reflect a lack of sensitivity. Moreover, although 
categorical timing tasks with multiple categories have been used to successfully demonstrate 
temporal binding with adults (Ebert & Wegner, 2010; Kumar & Srinivasan, 2017), there are 
no published studies that have used the bisection task. While the current task used fewer 
categories than those used with adults (4 rather than 10), initial pilot work with adults 
indicated that it was sufficiently sensitive to allow measurement of temporal binding. 
However, the use of four response options and the associated instructions meant that the task 
was too difficult for pre-schoolers. Thus, our youngest age group was 6- to 7-year-olds; we 
also included two older groups of children and an adult group. 
 
Developmental Predictions 
 
Given the limited number of studies that have explored the binding effect in children, 
and their conflicting results, it is difficult to confidently generate predictions concerning the 
developmental profile of the binding effect across this age range. Temporal binding can be 
seen as a top-down effect of causal beliefs on time perception, raising the possibility that this 
effect emerges or strengthens developmentally as children gain experience with the causal 
structure of the world. However, the work of Blakey et al. (2018) suggests that even 
 
preschoolers’ time perception is susceptible to influence from their causal representations. 
Moreover, Tecwyn et al. (under review) have demonstrated that the causal representations of 
4- to 10-year-old children influence their judgments about the temporal order of events in a 
similar way to adults. That is, children reorder events to align with their causal beliefs in the 
same way that adults do (Bechlivanidis & Lagnado, 2013, 2016). The relation between 
temporal binding and this type of reordering effect is poorly understood, and it remains 
 
unclear whether the same mechanisms underpin the two effects. Nevertheless, Tecwyn et 
al’s findings suggest that the bidirectional relationship between time and causality is 
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developmentally stable, at least from 4 years of age. It is therefore possible that the 
magnitude of temporal binding effects will not differ across our age groups. 
 
Alternatively, children may demonstrate greater binding than adults. To a greater 
extent than adults, children favor temporal cues over other sources of information when 
determining causal structure (McCormack, Frosch, Patrick, & Lagnado, 2015), even when a 
temporally distal candidate cause is statistically more likely (Siegler & Liebert, 1974), or a 
longer delay is compatible with mechanism information (Schlottmann, 1999). Taken 
together, these findings suggest a particularly close relation between temporal and causal 
cognition in children, with children placing greater weight on temporal cues when making 
 
causal judgments. This raises the possibility that children’s causal representations may also 
have a stronger effect on their perception of temporal intervals, i.e., that children may show 
greater binding than their adult counterparts. Indeed, such bidirectional strong links between 
time and causation early in development could potentially support acquisition of stable causal 
beliefs. That is, temporal contiguity may serve a simple heuristic that typically yields causal 
beliefs, but once an initial belief is formed, it may in turn be reinforced as a result of temporal 
binding exaggerating the temporal proximity of causes and their effects. 
 
Experiment 1 
 
Method 
 
Participants. One hundred and forty-two participants completed the task: 40 6- to 7- 
 
year-olds (Mage = 82 months, SDage = 3.60, range: 73-88 months, 35% female), 31 7- to 8- 
 
year-olds (Mage =100 months, SDage = 3.79, range= 90-106 months, 50% female), 37 9- to 10- 
 
year-olds (Mage =126 months, SDage = 3.63, range: 119-131 months, 30% female), and 34 
 
adults (Mage = 278 months, SDage = 82.8 months, range: 218-523 months, 76% female). The 
 
child participants were recruited from 3 different school year-groups. Adult participants were 
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undergraduate students participating in exchange for course credit. Ethical approval 
was granted by the Research Ethics Committee of the university of the first author. 
 
Materials. The experiment was completed by participants individually in a quiet area. 
 
Participants sat in front of a Dell laptop computer (60 Hz refresh rate) with 15.6” screen, to 
which a 4-button Black Box Toolkit USB response box was connected. The experiment was 
run using EPrime 2.0 software (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA). 
 
Design and Procedure. The task was comprised of three phases. The first two phases 
were designed to introduce participants to the equipment and task features that would enable 
them to complete the third phase with accuracy. Figure 1 provides an overview of the first 
two phases; Figure 2 outlines the final, experimental phase. 
 
 
Familiarization 
Phase 
 
“Look. The circle gets filled in as time passes. The more time 
that passes, the more the circle gets filled in.” 
 
 
 
 
“Now the circle will be inside of a star. The more time that the star is 
on the screen for, the more the circle will get filled in” 
 
 
 
 
 
Training Phase
 “The circle is going to disappear so you won’t see it filling in 
anymore… Tell me how much of the circle you think could have 
filled in while the star was on the screen.” 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Overview of the first two task phases. Participants were trained to associate the 
circle segments with different amounts of time 
 
Familiarization Phase 
 
Participants were first shown a demonstration of how a circle “fills in” as time passes. 
 
Specifically, they were shown that it took “a little bit of time” (200 ms) for ¼ of the circle to 
 
fill in, a “bit more time” (400 ms) for ½ of the circle to fill in, “even more time” (600 ms) for 
 
¾ of the circle to fill in, and finally it took the “most time” (800 ms) for the full circle to be 
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filled in completely. The appearance of the circle “filling in” was created by showing a series 
 
of images in quick succession. 
 
Participants’ ability to correctly match an onscreen circle segment to the 
corresponding segment on a button box was assessed in a series of trials. To do this, they 
watched as a circle appeared onscreen, began filling in and then disappeared, after which they 
 
were asked, “How much of the circle filled in that time?” Feedback was provided at the 
end of every trial. The task moved on after four correct responses in a row or after 12 trials. 
Training Phase 
 
Next, participants completed a temporal training phase in which they learned to associate 
each of the four circle segments with a specific delay. Following this, they were tested on their 
ability to accurately identify each of the target delays. The aim of this phase was to enable 
participants to accurately use the circle segments as a proxy for an estimate of time. Participants 
saw the circle embedded within a star and were told that the longer the star stayed on screen for, 
the more of the circle would get filled in. Participants watched as the circle in the middle of the 
star filled in while it was onscreen. Participants were used the response box to indicate how 
much of the circle had filled in while the star was on the screen. 
 
Participants were then told that the circle was going to disappear behind the star so 
they could no longer see it filling in. They then completed a series of trials in which a star 
flashed up on the screen and stayed there for one of the four target delays (200 ms, 400 ms, 
600 ms, 800 ms) before disappearing. After the star had disappeared from the screen 
 
participants were asked: “How much of the circle could have filled in while the star was on 
 
the screen?” Feedback was provided at the end of every trial. Delay order was randomized 
across trials. The training phase ended when participants got four answers correct in a row or 
when they completed 40 trials, whichever came first. Prior to analysis, those participants who 
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did not achieve four correct answers in a row were excluded. Table 1 shows the 
average number of training trials per age-group. 
 
Table 1 
Average number of training phase trials (SD) per age-group  
 
Age-Group Experiment 1 Experiment 2 
   
6-7-year-olds 8.40 (3.69) 8.66 (3.81) 
7-8-year-olds 9.96 (5.09) 8.97 (4.71) 
8-9-year-olds n/a 8.73 (3.93) 
9-10-year-olds 8.59 (3.92) 9.00 (5.04) 
Adults 6.88 (2.01) 7.48 (3.53) 
    
 
 
Experimental Phase 
 
The experimental phase consisted of two conditions, one causal (Figure 2A) and one 
non-causal (Figure 2B). In this portion of the task, participants used their newly-acquired 
understanding of the delays and associated circle segments to estimate the time between two 
events. In the causal condition, participants used the response box to indicate the length of 
time between a tone that accompanied their button press and a subsequent rocket launch. In 
the non-causal condition, they estimated the time between a predictive signal and rocket 
launch. The two conditions of the experimental phase were blocked so that all trials in one 
condition were completed before the next condition started. Both conditions were completed 
by all participants, in counterbalanced order. 
 
In the causal condition, participants were told that a rocket would “start getting ready 
 
to launch” when they pressed the launch button that was in front of them. Their button press 
 
was accompanied by a “beep” and visual of the onscreen button depressing. In the non-causal 
condition, the rocket started getting ready from a signal consisting of an onscreen flash and 
 
an audible beep. When the rocket launched, a “whoosh” was heard and the onscreen rocket 
moved to the launched position. After each launch, participants indicated how much of the 
 
circle they thought would have filled in while the rocket was “getting ready”. In both 
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conditions, the time the rocket spent “getting ready” was the time between the audiovisual 
 
signal, and the “whoosh” that accompanied the rocket moving to the launched position. 
Participants were instructed that this was the interval to be judged. The delay between the 
first event (the button press, or the predictive signal) and the rocket launch was 300 ms, 
500 ms, or 700 ms. The delay was randomized with eight presentations of each delay in 
each condition, making 24 trials in each condition and 48 trials in total. The participants 
were naïve to the fact that the delays were not the same as those in the training phase. In 
using delays in the experimental phase that fell between those learnt in the previous two 
phases, participants were unknowingly forced to choose whether they experienced the 
experimental delays as more similar to intervals that were slightly longer or shorter than 
they were in reality. Temporal causal binding would thus manifest as a higher probability 
to choose a shorter interval in causal compared to non-causal conditions 
 
 
A) Causal B)  Non-causal 
 
 
 
Participant’s        Wait  
button press 
        
 
        
 
         
 
          
  
 
Audio-visual signal 
 
 
Audio-visual signal 
 
 
 
 
Wait  
Wait  
      
Rocket 
 
      
 
Rocket          
launch 
 
launch           
 
       
 
       
  
 
 
Figure 2. Schematic of the A) causal and B) non-causal conditions of the experimental phase. 
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Results  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Proportion of each response type for Experiment 1 panelled by age-group (horizontally) and delay (vertically). 
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Only the data of those participants who passed the training phase were analysed. This 
criterion excluded 19 participants from analysis: 10 6- to 7- year-olds, five 7- to 8- year-olds, 
three 9- to 10 -year-olds. This left 34 adults, 34 9- to 10- year-olds, 26 7- to 8- year-olds and 
30 6- to 7- year-olds in the analysis. The proportion of times participants selected each 
response category (200 ms, 400 ms, 600 ms, 800 ms) for each of the three target delays can 
be seen in Figure 3, as a function of delay, condition, and age group. 
 
The ordinal package in R (Christensen, 2018; R Core Team, 2014) was used to 
 
perform a cumulative link mixed model analysis of participants’ responses. A backward 
elimination approach was taken, in that a full model, encompassing condition, delay, and age 
as factors, was fitted before the model was reduced by eliminating non-significant factors. 
Participant ID was included as a random effect to account for the repeated-measures nature 
of the design as well as individual differences in response scale use. Variables were dummy 
coded such that the causal condition and the adult age-group were used as reference 
categories. Delay was set as an ordinal level variable meaning no reference category was 
required; instead, the model explores changes in the outcome variable that arise with each 
increase in delay (for example, when increasing from 300 ms to 500 ms and from 500 ms to 
700 ms). The AIC was used as a method of assessing goodness of fit, where lower AIC 
values represent a better fitting model (Schermelleh-Engel, Moosbrugger & Müller, 2003). 
 
The results of the final model can be seen in Table 2. It is important to note here that 
although the data shown in Figure 3 is on its observable scale (i.e., proportion of each response 
type given), the modelling is of log odds because this latent scale is considered more 
 
appropriate (Dixon, 2008). Briefly, the results indicate that participants’ estimate of delay 
increased significantly with each increase in the target delay, indicating a sensitivity to the 
manipulation of delay. Although all age-groups showed an ability to give higher estimates in 
response to greater delays, the likelihood of this happening increased with age. Crucially, 
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participants were more likely to give higher estimates of delay in the non-causal condition 
 
compared to the causal condition, demonstrating temporal binding. 
 
 
Table 2.    
Results of cumulative link mixed model    
     
 Parameter (S.E) Odds Ratio z 
 Condition    
 Non-causal .45 (.051) 1.57 8.82*** 
 Delay (ms)    
 Ascending 2.36 (.10) 10.6 23.9*** 
 Delay (ms) × Age-group (years-    
 old)    
 Delay × 6-7 -1.64 (.13) .19 -12.6*** 
 Delay × 7-8 -1.37 (.13) .25 -10.1*** 
 Delay × 9-10 -.68 (.13) .51 -5.34*** 
 
Note: The original model consisted of the following terms; Condition, Delay, Age-group, Condition 
× Delay, Condition × Age-group, Delay × Age-group, Condition × Delay × Age-group, which gave 
an AIC value of 13306. This model was then reduced to include only the significant terms shown in 
the table above which gave an improved AIC value of 13292 suggesting that the final model is a 
better fit for the data. Reference categories used were causal-condition and adult age-group. All 
effects were significant at the p < .001 level. 
 
 
Delay Effects. 
 
The positive main effect of delay indicates that participants were more likely to give 
higher estimates for higher delays. The significant interaction between delay and age-group 
indicates that there was a developmental change in the ability to accurately discriminate 
between the target delays. Inspection of the beta values and odds ratios indicate that the odds 
of the youngest age group giving a higher response to longer delays were less than the odds 
of adults doing so. This difference decreases with age, although even the older children were 
 
less accurate than the adults. This suggests that children’s ability to discriminate between the 
delays increases with age throughout childhood and into adulthood. The above model was rerun 
with each age-group as the reference category in-turn. This allowed for more thorough 
comparisons of the developmental age-effects. The results indicated that the effect of delay in 
each age-group was significantly different from all other age-groups; younger age-groups 
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were less likely than older age-groups to give higher estimates in response to greater delays 
(all p< .05). This indicates that the task is appropriately sensitive to detect developmental 
changes in time perception. To ensure that participants of every age-group could accurately 
discriminate between the target delays i.e., appropriately engage with the task, the age groups 
were considered independently, and response data was modelled with delay as a predictor 
variable and participant as a random factor. The results indicate that delay was a significant, 
positive predictor of response in every age-group, all ps < .001. 
 
Effect of condition. 
 
Critical to the aim of the study, the results indicate that response varied significantly 
as a factor of condition. As can be seen in the Odd Ratio column of Table 2, participants were 
significantly more likely to give a higher temporal estimate in the non-causal condition than 
the causal condition, independent of age and delay. This pattern of results is typical of the 
temporal binding effect in which participants perceive delays in causal contexts as shorter 
than delays in non-causal contexts. Condition did not interact significantly with age. 
 
Discussion 
 
The results indicate that both children and adults perceive the temporal interval between 
a cause and its effect as shorter than the interval between a non-causal signal and subsequent 
event. Although children were less accurate in the timing task than adults, the magnitude of the 
binding effect did not differ with age. These results provide the first evidence that the binding 
effect, previously only observed in children and adults in separate experimental paradigms, is 
developmentally stable, at least from 6 years of age. These results extend those of Blakey et al. 
(2018) by showing that causal representations influence the time perception of both children and 
adults in the same way and to the same extent. Although previous research has suggested that 
temporal information is weighted more heavily in young 
 
children’s determination of causal structure than adults’ (e.g., McCormack et al., 2015; 
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Schlottmann, 1999), there was no evidence that causal beliefs had a greater influence on 
 
children’s duration judgments; the causal representations of children appear to affect 
their experience and perception of time in much the same way as adults. 
 
Not only is the task presented in Experiment 1 the first task that allows for binding 
to be explored in both adults and children, but the task itself is a novel way of assessing time 
perception in children. The results indicate that young children differentiated between the 
delays to a lesser extent than older children and adults. This is in line with many previous 
developmental time perception studies (see Droit-Volet, 2003 for review) that show 
 
children’s temporal discrimination ability is less precise than adults’ (e.g., Droit-Volet et al., 
2003; Droit-Volet & Wearden, 2001; McCormack et al., 1999). In short, our developmental time 
perception results compare well with those using well-established measures. 
 
That being said, a higher number of the youngest children (6- to 7- year-olds) failed 
the temporal training relative to the other age-groups, and the proportion of participants who 
passed the training phase improved with age. This is not wholly unexpected given that the 
paradigm is more complicated than classic timing tasks, such as the generalization or 
bisection tasks (e.g., Droit-Volet, 2003; Droit-Volet & Izaute, 2005; Lustig & Meck, 2011; 
McCormack et al., 1999) that only require participants to remember one or two reference 
durations. Importantly though, the majority of even the youngest children successfully 
completed the time training phase and showed a sensitivity to delay in the test phase, 
indicating that they understood and remembered the mapping of temporal durations onto the 
circle segments that were used as a proxy for their time estimates. Thus, the task developed in 
Experiment 1 has the potential to be used as a novel way of assessing developmental 
differences in time perception beyond the binding effect. 
 
Experiment 2 
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There is some debate within the temporal binding literature concerning what 
underlies the effect. Originally researchers thought that binding occurs only for intentional 
action (i.e., actions one has deliberately carried out oneself; Haggard et al., 2002). However, 
subsequent research has shown that causality, irrespective of intentionality, is both necessary 
(Buehner & Humphreys, 2009) and sufficient (Buehner, 2012) to bring about the binding 
effect in adults. Similarly, Blakey et al. (2018) found that the magnitude of the binding effect 
in children did not vary significantly as a product of who or what (self or machine) initiates 
the causal action, suggesting that it is the presence of causality that is critical. With these 
previous findings in mind, we have assumed thus far that causality rather than intentionality 
of action drives the binding effect observed in Experiment 1. 
 
However, some past research with adults has shown that intentionality may 
modulate the magnitude of the binding effect in adults, with the effect being greater when 
causes are self-generated actions rather than the observed actions of another person (e.g., 
Buehner, 2012; Dogge et al., 2012). Given that Blakey et al. (2018) found no such evidence 
of a bolstered effect in the context of self-generated action in their 4- to 11 -year-old 
participants, this modulation of the effect may be specific to adults. That being said, other 
studies with adults have found no such evidence of a bolstered effect in self-causal contexts 
(Poonian, McFayden, Ogden & Cunnington, 2015; Suzuki et al., 2019). This may indicate 
that, rather than being a developmental trend in the effect, the modulation of the binding 
effect through the addition of intentional action may instead be task-dependent. 
 
Experiment 2 sought to address this issue by adapting our categorical timing task to 
explore the binding effect in two causal conditions: one in which the cause of the rocket 
 
launch was the participant’s own intentional action, and the other in which the cause was the 
 
experimenter’s action. Of interest was whether the binding effect was greater for self-causal 
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trials compared to other-causal trials, and whether any modulating effect of intentional 
action was developmentally constant. 
 
Method 
 
Participants. One hundred and ten participants took part in the experiment: 33 6- to 
 
7- year-olds (Mage = 88 months, SDage = 3.62, Range: 82-94, 64% female), 30 7- to 8- year- 
 
olds (Mage = 101, SDage = 3.12, Range: 95-107, 40% female), 24 8- to 9- year-olds (Mage = 
 
113 months, SDage = 3.99, Range: 105-118, 50% female), 27 9- to 10- year-olds (Mage = 124 
 
months, SDage = 3.29, Range: 119-130, 48% female), and 29 adults (Mage = 275 months, SDage 
 
= 71.4, Range: 223-529, 86% female). The child participants were recruited from 3 different 
school year-groups. Adult participants were undergraduate students participating in 
exchange for course credit. 
 
Design and Procedure. The method employed was the same of that of Experiment 
1 except with an additional condition in the experimental phase. The added experimenter-
causal condition consisted of a block of 24 trials, eight of each target delay, just as with the 
self-causal and non-causal conditions, giving 72 trials in total. In this condition, participants 
were required to watch the experimenter press the button, which resulted in a rocket launch 
following one of three target delays. 
The experimenter pressed the button at a random time after the start of each trial, 
 
ensuring the participant was focused on the task before doing so. The experimenter based the 
 
timing of their button presses on the average latency of participants’ button presses from 
Experiment 1, taking into account the age of the participant. Generally, the experimenter’s 
button press occurred within the first 2000 ms of the start of the trial. The experimenter’s 
 
button press was accompanied by an audible beep just as the participant’s was. This ensured 
that the participant was aware that the button had been pressed and that the interval to be 
judged had started. Just as with the other two conditions, after every trial the participants 
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were asked how much of the circle they thought could have filled in while the rocket was 
 
“getting ready to launch”. 
 
Results 
 
As with Experiment 1, only the data of those participants who passed the training 
 
phase with four-in-a-row correct were analysed. This criterion excluded 4 participants from 
 
analysis: one 6- to 7- year-old, two 8- to 9- year-olds, and one 9- to 10- year-old. This left 32 
 
6- to 7- year-olds, 30 7- to 8- year-olds, 22 8- to 9- year-olds, 26 9- to 10- year-olds, and 29 
 
adults in the final dataset. As with Experiment 1, the proportion of each response (200 ms, 
 
400 ms, 600 ms, 800 ms) to each of the three delays was calculated for the three conditions. 
 
These data can be seen in Figure 4. 
 
Again, as with Experiment 1, the response data of Experiment 2 were analysed using 
 
R’s ordinal package (Christensen, 2018; R Core Team, 2014). The same backward 
 
elimination approach taken in Experiment 1 was once again employed. Variables were 
 
dummy coded such that the non-causal baseline condition, and adult age-group were used as 
 
reference categories. The final model can be seen in Table 3. 
 
Table 3.     
Results of cumulative link mixed model     
 Parameter (S.E) Odds Ratio z 
 Condition     
 Self-causal -.37 (.047) .69 -7.82*** 
 Experimenter-causal -.14 (.047) .87 -2.90** 
 Delay (ms)     
 Ascending 2.08 (.080) 8.00 26.0*** 
 Delay (ms) × Age-group (years-old)     
 Delay × 6-7 -1.34 (.11) .26 -12.7*** 
 Delay × 7-8 -1.12 (.11) .33 -10.5*** 
 Delay × 8-9 -.66 (.12) .68 -5.63*** 
 Delay × 9-10 -.23 (.11) .79 -2.10* 
 
Note: The original model consisted of the following terms; Condition, Delay, Age-group, Condition 
× Delay, Condition × Age-group, Delay × Age-group, Condition × Delay × Age-group, which gave 
an AIC value of 22982. This model was then reduced to include only the significant terms shown in 
the table above which gave an improved AIC value of 22960 suggesting that the final model is a 
better fit for the data. Reference categories used were, non-causal condition and adult age-group. 
Significance codes: *** p< .001, ** p< .01, * p< .05. 
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Figure 4. Proportion of each response type in Experiment 2 panelled by age-group (horizontally) and delay (vertically). 
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Delay Effects. 
 
The positive main effect of delay indicates that participants were more likely to give 
higher estimates for higher delays. The interaction between delay and age-group indicates 
that the ability to discriminate between delays varied with age. The results indicate that 
children of all ages were significantly less likely than adults to give a higher estimate in 
response to longer delays. The ability to discriminate between delays increased with age. 
The above model was rerun with each age-group as the reference category in-turn. This 
allowed for more thorough comparisons of the developmental age-effects. The results 
indicated that the effect of delay in each age-group differed significantly from all other age-
groups with younger age-groups being less likely than older age-groups to give higher 
estimates in response to greater delays (all p< .05) As with Experiment 1, the data was split 
by age-group and the analysis was rerun to ensure that participants of every age-group could 
accurately discriminate between the target delays. The results indicate that delay was a 
significant and positive predictor of response in every age-group, all ps < .001. 
 
Effect of condition. 
 
Critical to the aims of the study, participants were more likely to give higher temporal 
estimates in the non-causal condition than in either the self-causal or experimenter-causal 
conditions. This indicates that participants experienced delays as shorter in the two causal 
conditions than in the non-causal baseline, a pattern of results typical of temporal binding. 
Pairwise comparisons were run to explore the difference between the two causal conditions. 
Results reveal that participants were more likely to give a higher temporal estimate in the 
experimenter-causal condition than in the self-causal condition, (SE) = .23 (.047), odds ratio 
= 1.26, p < .001. These results suggest that the presence of intentional action bolsters the 
magnitude of the binding effect. 
 
Discussion 
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The results of Experiment 2 showed that participants of all ages were more likely to 
perceive delays between causally related events as shorter than the same delay between two 
unrelated events. These results replicate the findings of Experiment 1 in a new sample. In 
addition, the results suggest that the magnitude of binding is greater for self-generated action-
outcome sequences compared to observed action-outcome sequences. This latter result 
suggests that the addition of intentional action bolsters the binding effect. The lack of a 
developmental trend in these results further indicates that the binding effect is present and 
consistent from at least 6 years of age into adulthood. 
 
The finding that the binding effect was stronger for self-generated action-outcome 
sequences than observed sequences is consistent with some past studies that have used adult 
participants (e.g., Buehner, 2012; Dogge et al., 2012). However, it contrasts with the findings 
of Blakey et al. (2018) who observed binding of equal magnitude in children both when they 
caused the outcome themselves and when a machine caused the outcome. This disparity in 
results may be indicative of task-related differences in how the binding effect presents. 
Indeed, even studies with adults on whether the addition of intentionality alters the effect has 
produced mixed results (e.g., Poonian et al., 2015; Suzuki et al., 2019). Why this is the case is 
not clear, highlighting the fact that although the binding effect has been consistently found 
using many different types of timing tasks, the mechanism or mechanisms underpinning this 
effect are still not fully understood. 
 
General Discussion 
 
In this study we developed a novel, child-friendly paradigm to measure temporal 
binding. We were able to compare the binding effect in both adults and children for the first 
time. The results showed that both adults and children were more likely to perceive delays 
between cause and effect as shorter than the same delay between a predictive signal and 
outcome. The results of Experiment 1 provide support for the notion that the binding effect is 
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not a late-emerging phenomenon; rather it is observable and consistent from at least 6 years 
of age. Experiment 2 replicated the results of Experiment 1, and extended them by showing 
 
that although the binding effect is observable in causal contexts in which the participants’ 
intentional action is not the cause of an outcome, the presence of intentional action bolsters the 
magnitude of the effect. Again, this was true of both adults and children. 
 
Arguably, the method developed and utilized here to assess binding is the first 
experimental paradigm that is suitable for studying binding in participants across a wide age-
range. We have suggested that the two experimental paradigms used within this area in the 
past have either not been ideal for use with child participants (i.e., Cavazzana et al., 
2014,2017), or been unsuitable for comparisons between children and adults (i.e., Blakey et 
al., 2018). Our results indicate that the task we used, which required minimal motor skills 
and was less cognitively demanding than that of Cavazzana et al., was suitable for adults and 
 
children. Perhaps unsurprisingly, there was age-related variation in participants’ 
temporal discrimination in both experiments. Children were less accurate than adults in 
discriminating between the test durations, and this was particularly true of the youngest 
group of children. This aligns well with previous research that has shown a general age-
related improvement in the accuracy of time perception, (Droit-Volet et al., 2003; Droit-
Volet & Izaute, 2009; McCormack et al., 1999). Importantly, even though timing improved 
in accuracy developmentally, participants of every age discriminated between the target 
delays, suggesting that the task is sufficiently sensitive for use with both children and adults. 
This task yielded evidence of binding in all age-groups indicating that, contrary to the 
claims of Cavazzana et al. (2014, 2017), the binding effect is not late emerging as long an 
age-appropriate paradigm is used. 
 
The method used here to assess children’s ability to make sub-second timing 
 
judgments may be of interest to those exploring binding- and timing more generally- in both 
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child and adult populations. One of the benefits of this paradigm is that it does not require 
knowledge or use of conventional timing units. This is not only advantageous for use with 
children, whose knowledge of clock units is limited (see Block et al., 1999 for review), it also 
has its advantages for use with adult populations. For example, using a categorization 
judgment allows for the unusual task of explicitly quantifying a sub-second temporal interval 
(a method used in some studies of binding) to be circumvented. Although keeping track of 
sub-second intervals is essential for the completion of everyday tasks, explicitly quantifying 
temporal intervals of such small magnitude is something that is typically only performed 
during experimental tasks in lab settings. 
 
Our categorization task has some similarities with the temporal bisection task that 
used extensively in timing studies, including many with children (e.g., Droit-Volet & 
Wearden, 2001; McCormack et al., 1999). As mentioned in the introduction, we did not use a 
bisection task because we were concerned about the sensitivity of such a task with regard to 
measuring binding. Use of a more complex categorization task had a further advantage, 
which is that it allowed us to explore whether binding was present across a set of different 
target delays (300, 500, and 700 ms). The delays at which the binding effect is observable 
has been found to vary both within and between paradigms (e.g., Berberian, Sarrazin, Le 
Blaye & Haggard, 2012; Buehner & Humphreys, 2009; Haggard et al., 2002). Our analysis 
did not find that the magnitude of the binding effect varied with delay length, indicating that 
in the current paradigm, at least across this range of delays, the effect is robust. 
 
The results of both experiments also indicated that there is no developmental variation 
in the magnitude of the binding effect. Although, as discussed in the introduction, there is 
some evidence to suggest that children privilege temporal cues more so than adults when 
making causal judgments (e.g., McCormack et al., 2015; Schlottmann, 1999), we found no 
 
evidence that children’s timing judgments are in turn more heavily influenced by their causal 
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beliefs. In previous studies that indicated that children tended to privilege temporal cues in 
making causal judgments, such cues were pitted against statistical information or information 
about causal mechanism. One plausible reason that children privileged temporal information 
is because it is salient and easier to process and bring to bear in making causal judgments 
than these other types of information (see McCormack, 2015, for discussion). That is, 
 
perhaps temporal cues have a special status with regard to children’s causal judgments 
 
because making use of such cues is less costly in terms of processing resources (though see 
White, 2014, for an alternative explanation). However, it is not obvious that there is any 
similar saving in processing costs when temporal judgments are influenced by causal beliefs; 
given that, it is perhaps not surprising that larger binding effects were not observed in 
children than in adults. Nevertheless, the fact that temporal binding can be observed in 
young children, and does not increase in magnitude across development, strongly suggests 
that the bidirectionality of the relation between time and causation is fundamental. 
 
In addition to understanding the developmental roots of the binding effect, exploration of 
the effect from a developmental perspective is of interest because measuring binding in the 
context of intentional action has been suggested as a way of implicitly measuring the sense that 
one is the cause of an outcome (sense of agency; e.g., Caspar, Christensen, Cleeremans 
& Haggard, 2016; Caspar, Cleeremans & Haggard, 2018). An implicit measure of sense of 
agency might be thought to be particularly useful in a developmental context, both because 
of the potential difficulties in asking children to make explicit judgments of sense of agency, 
and because of the possibility that sense of agency itself might show interesting 
developmental patterns (Metcalfe, Eich & Castel, 2010; van Elk, Rutjens & van der Pligt, 
2015). We note, though, that our findings in Experiment 2, along with other published 
findings (e.g., Buehner, 2012; Poonian, & Cunnington, 2013; Suzuki, Lush, Seth, & 
Roseboom, 2019), indicate that temporal binding is observed even when the cause of an 
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outcome is not a self-generated action, suggesting that it is a broader effect stemming from 
causal representations rather than reflecting a sense of agency per se. Nevertheless, the 
development of appropriate ways of measuring binding in children may provide researchers 
with an alternative to explicit causal judgments, thus allowing for the assessment of causal 
cognition in young children who may be less able to explicitly articulate their causal 
knowledge. That is, future studies could potentially use the binding effect as an index of 
 
children’s causal representations. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, Experiment 1 presented a novel paradigm that was successfully used to 
elicit the binding effect in both adults and children. The results indicated that both adults and 
children were more likely to perceive delays between causes and effects as shorter than 
delays between unrelated events. Experiment 2 provided further evidence for the suitability 
of the new paradigm and expanded the results to show that the binding effect is not limited to 
self-action; it also occurs, albeit to a lesser extent, when observing the actions of others. That 
is, both adults and children showed greater binding for self-generated action-outcome 
sequences than for observed action-outcome sequences. Taken together, these results suggest 
that although causality underlies the effect in both children and adults, the addition of 
intentionality can modulate the magnitude of the effect. These experimental results present 
the first evidence that the binding effect is present and consistent from childhood into 
adulthood. 
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